Effects of Legal and Unauthorized Immigration on the U.S. Social Security System by Benítez-Silva, Hugo et al.
MichiganUniversity of
Research
Retirement
Center
Working Paper 
 WP 2011-250 
 
 
Project #:  UM11-07 
M R
R C
Effects of Legal and Unauthorized Immigration on the 
U.S. Social Security System  
Hugo Benítez-Silva, Eva Cárceles-Poveda, and Selçuk Eren
  
 
Effects of Legal and Unauthorized Immigration on the U.S. Social 
Security System 
Hugo Benítez-Silva 
SUNY-Stony Brook 
Eva Cárceles-Poveda 
SUNY-Stony Brook 
Selçuk Eren 
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 
September 2011 
Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 
Ann Arbor, MI 48104 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/ 
(734) 615-0422 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # RRC08098401-03-00).  The findings and 
conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Social 
Security Administration, any agency of the Federal government, or the Michigan Retirement 
Research Center. 
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Julia Donovan Darrow, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bingham Farms; Denise Ilitch, Bingham Farms; Olivia P. 
Maynard, Goodrich; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe Park; S. Martin 
Taylor, Gross Pointe Farms; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mary Sue Coleman, ex officio 
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Security System 
Abstract 
Immigration is having an increasingly important effect on the social insurance system in the 
United States. On the one hand, eligible legal immigrants have the right to eventually receive 
pension benefits, but also rely on other aspects of the social insurance system such as health care, 
disability, unemployment insurance, and welfare programs, while most of their savings have 
direct positive effects on the domestic economy. On the other hand, most undocumented 
immigrants contribute to the system through taxed wages, but they are not eligible for these 
programs unless they attain legal status, and a large proportion of their savings translates into 
remittances, which have no direct effects on the domestic economy. Moreover, a significant 
percentage of immigrants migrate back to their countries of origin after a relatively short period 
of time, and their savings while in the US are predominantly in the form of remittances. 
Therefore, any analysis that tries to understand the impact of immigrant workers on the overall 
system has to take into account the decisions and events these individuals face throughout their 
lives, as well as the use of the government programs they are entitled to. We propose a life-cycle 
OLG model in a General Equilibrium framework of legal and undocumented immigrants’ 
decisions regarding consumption, savings, labor supply and program participation to analyze 
their role in the financial sustainability of the system. Our analysis of the effects of potential 
policy changes, such as giving some undocumented immigrants legal status, shows increases in 
capital stock, output, consumption, labor productivity, and overall welfare. The effects are 
relatively small in percentage terms, but considerable given the size of our economy. 
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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of immigration on the social insurance system is a policy issue
of growing importance that needs to be carefully analyzed and discussed by
economists and policy makers. Immigration to the United States has grown
rapidly for the last four decades. The foreign-born share of the U.S. popula-
tion went up from 5 to 12.5 percent between 1970 and 2007 (Borjas, 2009). In
fact, the foreign born population reached approximately 40.2 million by 2010
with almost 30 percent of the foreign born entering the United States within
the last decade (American Community Survey, 2009). Moreover, the immi-
grant population aged during the time period, and the share of immigrants
in the population who are older than age 65 went up from 8 percent during
the 1990s to 12.5 percent by 2008.1 Additionally, as of March 2010 (Passel
and Cohn 2011) the number of undocumented immigrants has reached ap-
proximately 3.7 percent of the total population, with a total of 11.2 million
people, and the number of legal immigrants is around 29 million, at around
9.58 percent of the population. While research on the eﬀects of migrants on
local labor markets has attracted considerable attention,2 the importance of
understanding the eﬀect of immigration on public programs is only recently
being recognized.3
In a Pay-As-You-Go system, increased immigration has a positive eﬀect
on the health of the public pension system, at least in the short and medium
run. Migrants who work pay their labor taxes, and given that these individu-
als are generally young, their taxes are used to support the benefits payments
of the older generations. The statement is certainly true for legal immigrants.
Moreover, as Porter (2005) reports, undocumented immigrants, working un-
der Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers or sometimes fake Social
Security numbers, in many cases also pay Social Security taxes but are un-
likely to receive the benefits from their withholdings, suggesting that at least
in this dimension, undocumented immigration contributes positively to the
1In fact 17 percent of the legal immigrant adults are above age 65, but only 1.3 percent
of the unauthorized immigrant adults are above that age, compared with 16.4 percent for
U.S. native adults (Passel and Cohn, 2009).
2See Greenwood (1975, 1997), Borjas (1994), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Lucas (1997),
and Gallup (1997). HDR (2009) provides an illuminating discussion of current trends and
possible policy reforms related to international migration.
3See Lee and Miller (1997, 2000), Bonin, Raﬀelhüschen, and Walliser (2000), Storeslet-
ten (2000, 2003), Auerbach and Oreopolis (2000), Wilson (2003), Collado, Iturbe-
Ormaetxe, and Valera (2004), Schou (2006), and Sand and Razin (2007).
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financial health of the system. The long run eﬀects on the system, however,
will depend on whether these immigrants are net contributors to the system
given their wage paths, their labor histories, program participation, length
of stay in the U.S., and their other needs likely to be covered by the social
insurance system in place. To determine this, one needs to take into account
several important dimensions. First of all, legal immigrants not only have the
right to eventually receive pension benefits, but also disability, health care,
and unemployment insurance. In fact, they may be more likely to receive
some of these benefits given their characteristics and constraints when they
arrive in the United States.4 Second of all, undocumented immigrants pay
some taxes but are in principle not eligible, becoming net contributors to
the system. However, they may obtain legal status, in which case their char-
acteristics and comparatively lower health investments will probably make
them more costly for the social insurance system. Third, around 30 percent
of immigrants migrate back to their countries of origin within 10 years of
immigration (Duleep and Dowhan 2008a), possibly losing eligibility to the
social programs due to short spells of work in the U.S.5 We therefore conclude
that any analysis that tries to understand the impact of immigrant workers
on the overall system has to take into account the decisions and events diﬀer-
ent types of immigrants face throughout their lives, as well as the use of all
the government programs they are entitled to. Empirically, when we look at
individual programs, we find that 14 percent of immigrants older than age 25
are participating in Social Security compared to 20 percent of natives in the
same age group. This is not surprising due to diﬀerences in age distribution
as well as the diﬀering rates in length of stay in the United States.
An important issue, and key aspect of our research, when considering
possible reforms to the system is the tension between the decisions regard-
ing domestic savings and remittances that immigrants make. In the General
Equilibrium framework we present we make this explicit, and analyze the
diﬀerential eﬀects on the economy between resources saved in the host coun-
try versus resources sent back to the country of origin.6 The former foster
4Borjas and Hilton (1996) document the diﬀerential usage of public programs by im-
migrants.
5Depending on the country of origin, some legal immigrants might receive Social Secu-
rity benefits after working for a period in their countries thanks to reciprocity agreements
signed by the U.S. According to Passel (1999), only 25 percent of undocumented immi-
grants stay more than 10 years in the United States.
6Cespedes (2011) presents a General Equilibrium model of immigrants from the point
2
economic growth, while the latter do not improve the economic conditions
of the country even if they provide utility to the senders. If documented
immigrants save more domestically while undocumented immigrants send a
higher proportion of their resources overseas, any reform might have a sizable
positive eﬀect on economic growth via savings, but the final eﬀect is a func-
tion of the possible increase in the social insurance expenditures linked with
creating a framework in which the number of undocumented immigrants who
have lived in the U.S. for a long time is minimized.
Regarding remittances, immigrants that are planning to stay longer are
less likely to send money back home, and in return save more money to in-
crease their capital and future earnings. This is important information, and
when coupled with the evidence from the Mexican Migrant Survey (2005),
which indicates that 38 percent of those who do not have legal U.S. identi-
fication plan to return back to Mexico within a five year period, points in
the direction of the diﬀerential savings vehicles we have mentioned above. In
terms of orders of magnitude, according to the Mexican Migration Project,
65 percent of immigrants sent back remittances on a monthly basis with the
average monthly remittance nearing 263 dollars in real terms.
The objective of the analysis is to understand the long term eﬀects of le-
gal and unauthorized immigration on the financial viability of the U.S. econ-
omy in general, and the Social Security system in particular. We present
an equilibrium model of the key decisions of immigrants. We analyze their
decisions regarding their labor supply productivity, consumption, wealth ac-
cumulation, and retirement, and we will account for the diﬀerent incentive
structures and eligibility rules faced by legal and undocumented immigrants
regarding their retirement and their unemployment benefits. We propose the
equilibrium setting to account for the macroeconomic eﬀects of immigration,
given that the general equilibrium eﬀects of migration are particularly im-
portant when studying the sustainability of social insurance programs, since
changes in wages, labor productivity and interest rates directly aﬀect the
government budget through changes in tax revenues and government debt.7
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the diﬀerential savings strategies of docu-
of view of the country of origin, in which households stochastically face a probability of
sending remittances, and then choose them endogenously.
7Most research, including Storesletten’s (2000) and Wilson (2003) general equilibrium
setting, does not account for the endogenous participation of immigrants in social insurance
programs. Kemnitz (2003) does account for the presence of unemployment insurance but
not other programs.
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mented and undocumented immigrants and their eﬀect on economic growth
makes this equilibrium framework a key aspect in understanding the eﬀects
of possible reforms to the system.
The set up of the problem faced by legal and undocumented immigrants
is a multi-period problem in which individuals start their careers in the host
country around the age of entering the labor market. Given the empirical ev-
idence, immigrants start with relatively low wages but within a decade legal
immigrants can obtain levels of wages more in line with those of natives while
undocumented immigrants continue to earn substantially less. From the ACS
2009, we find that immigrants and natives had the same rate of gainful em-
ployment at 78 percent, and immigrants (without distinction between legal
and undocumented) were making approximately $3,200 less on annual salary
and wage income compared to their native counterparts. In the model, im-
migrants choose work but face unemployment shocks, and choose how much
to consume and save. They obtain wages and are subject to unemployment
uncertainty, which for the moment we will model in a simplified framework
assuming a stationary distribution of employed and unemployed individuals.
Wages are taxed independently of the legal status, and legal immigrants may
receive a public pension when they reach a certain age and will be covered by
unemployment insurance if needed. Undocumented immigrants do not have
access to Social Security benefits but can receive unemployment insurance at
a slightly lower level (proxying for welfare programs) than natives and legal
immigrants.
A key aspect mentioned earlier is the savings behavior of these diﬀerent
types of immigrants.8 Legal immigrants save mostly through domestic ac-
cumulation of capital, which in our model is directly linked with economic
growth but they do send a proportion of their savings back to their coun-
try of origin in the form of remittances. On the other hand, undocumented
immigrants save a bit less but this is mostly reflected through remittances
back to their countries of origin. The key results of our model regarding
8Since the model should distinguish between documented and unauthorized immi-
grants, we use Passel’s (1999) residual approach to identify and assign status to immi-
grants in CPS data, the American Community Survey (ACS), and we also use intensively
the Mexican Migrant Survey of 2005, and the more recent Mexican Migration Project, and
the Latin American Migration Projects. Wages are separately modeled for natives, legal
and undocumented immigrants following the empirical evidence from the ACS and the
other data sets mentioned.We have benefited from recent work in the area of projecting
earnings for immigrants by Duleep and Dowhan (2008a and 2008b).
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reforms to the system come from the tension between the positive eﬀects on
economic growth of legalizing certain undocumented immigrants because of
the increased savings and increased labor productivity of the newly legalized
immigrants, versus the possible increased social insurance costs coming from
those newly legal immigrants who now have the right to receive the benefits
of the system at the same level as legal immigrants and natives.
The model we propose is computationally intensive but manageable, and
while apparently some researchers believe that this topic is better analyzed
within simple reduced form models, we believe it is essential to set the mi-
gration policy reform debate within a framework that can account for the
consequences in the general economy of legalizing a proportion of the more
than 11 million illegal immigrants we have in our country. A purely empirical
exercise, or even a partial equilibrium analysis, would fall short of a proper
analysis of immigration reform, so we have chosen to use a state-of-the-art
macroeconomic model strongly founded in the empirical and microeconomic
evidence regarding immigrants in the United States.
The model we present is a multi-period OLG model in which we have two
types of immigrants, which diﬀer in several dimensions. The three key dimen-
sions have to do with savings, usage of the social insurance system, and labor
productivity. Legal migrants save a much larger proportion of their income
domestically, which has a positive eﬀect on economic growth, while undoc-
umented immigrants choose remittances as their main way to save, which
only aﬀect positively the country of origin of those immigrants. Regarding
usage of the social insurance system, legal immigrants are in this case the
main users, with undocumented immigrants not being able to benefit from
it as much. Additionally, these two groups face diﬀerent wage productivi-
ties, with legal migrants able to obtain the same wages as natives thanks to
the fact that their abilities are better matched as opposed to undocumented
immigrants.
This model allows us to exemplify a key aspect we believe should be part
of the debate regarding immigration reform, which is the tension between
the contribution to economic growth of legal and undocumented immigrants
(through savings and labor productivity), versus the costs they subject the
system to through the usage of social insurance provisions. This trade-oﬀ is
critical to successfully analyze the optimal type of reform, and also to take
into account which variables to consider when proposing a path to legalize
undocumented immigrants.
We find significant positive eﬀects of legalization on capital stock, output,
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consumption levels, labor productivity, and the overall welfare of individuals,
even though the unemployment insurance tax and the Social Security tax
increase slightly. While the overall eﬀects are small in percentage terms,
given the size of our economy, the level eﬀects are considerable and increasing
in the rate of legalization.
The structure of the paper is the following. After presenting some empir-
ical evidence on legal and undocumented immigration in Section 2 which will
guide the parametrizations in our model, we describe the model in Section 3.
In Section 4 we discuss the calibration of the model to the US economy, and
Section 5 describes the benchmark results as well as the policy experiments
we propose and their consequences for the economy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Important Facts about Immigration
The role of immigration on the Social Security System is two-fold: Legal im-
migrants contribute taxes to the Social Security Trust Funds. Some return
to their country before they work long enough to become eligible for benefits
whereas others eventually become beneficiaries of the system. Unfortunately,
data is not available on the number of immigrants who emigrate back before
becoming eligible to receive benefits from the system. The Social Security
Administration, in its projections, assumes that 83 percent of emigrants (esti-
mated to be 30 percent of legal immigrants annually) leave the United States
before becoming eligible to receive benefits (Duleep, 1994). Undocumented
immigrants, on the other hand, are not able to collect benefits unless they
are legalized later while according to Social Security Administration (SSA)
actuaries about half of them are assumed to pay social security taxes. Addi-
tionally, immigrants support other social insurance programs by paying other
forms of taxes and they benefit from some of these programs.
Before discussing the key features of immigration data in our model, we
discuss the main stylized facts regarding immigrant population in the United
States using data from American Community Survey (2009). Foreign born
population reached approximately 40.1 million by 2009 (around 40.2 million
by 2010 as discussed in Passet and Cohn 2010) with almost 30 percent of the
foreign born entering the United States within the last decade. More than
a quarter of the foreign born population was born in Mexico, representing
the largest source of immigration to the United States. The immigrant pop-
ulation clusters around prime working age as 79 percent of immigrants were
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between ages 18 to 65 while only 60 percent of natives were in this age group
in 2009. Immigrants and natives had the same rate of gainful employment
at 78 percent. Immigrants are slightly more likely to be unemployed with an
unemployment rate of 6.4 percent compared to 6.1 percent of natives (Table
1). However, unemployment was more prominent among recent immigrants
as the rate goes up to 7.8 percent among immigrants who entered the United
States within the last decade. The same trend holds when we restrict our
attention to older individuals (age 40 and over). Only 4 percent of the native
population was unemployed in this age group compared to 5.2 percent of
immigrants. When it comes to social insurance programs, we observe the op-
posite trend as immigrants are less likely to be beneficiaries of Social Security
income that includes Old Age benefits as well as permanent Disability In-
surance (20.1 percent among natives versus 13.7 percent among immigrants,
see Table 1). This gap occurs both due to diﬀerences in age compositions
of natives versus immigrants as well as eligibility requirements. Immigrants
are less educated than natives where nearly 27 percent of immigrants lack a
high school diploma compared to only 8 percent of natives aged 18 or more
(Table 2). Moreover, there is no increase in education attainment for recent
immigrants suggesting that the wage gap between immigrants and natives re-
sults in lower per worker contributions to Social Security among immigrants
compared to natives.
For the analysis of role of immigration in the model, we need three mea-
sures. First is the amount of remittances, which reduces the available capital
in the United States and varies between unauthorized and legal immigrants
and will be further discussed in the next chapters. Unfortunately, there is no
single data source available to measure the amount of remittances sent from
the United States. We will rely on information from two companion data sets:
the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which started in 1982 to study the
migration patterns of Mexicans within Mexico and the United States and
the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), which employs the same
methodology to add Latin America and the Caribbean to the analysis and is
a more recent study. In both projects, interviewers gathered a complete life
history for the household head that returned to his home country. Datasets
provide detailed information on past migration experiences in the United
States including earnings, taxes paid as well as savings and remittances.
Moreover, interviewers administered identical questionnaires to households
in the United States, from the same communities in those countries who did
not return to their country of origin. Jointly these two datasets contain ten
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countries including Mexico, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Peru, Haiti, Guatemala, Columbia, and El Salvador. While
these datasets are far from complete to give us the whole picture of remit-
tances, these communities correspond to countries that sent more than half
of immigrants that are currently settled in the United States. Combining two
datasets, we have 9,328 observations. Table 3 shows rates of remittances and
savings as well as average monthly remittances and savings with positive val-
ues adjusted for inflation to 2008 prices. Nearly two-thirds of all households
sent monthly remittances with the average remittance being 404 dollars per
month among the households who sent remittances. Sending remittances is
more common among unauthorized immigrants with nearly three quarters of
households with unauthorized heads sent back money home compared to 55
percent among legal immigrants. Average remittances are 12 dollars higher
among legal immigrants who actually send home money. On the other hand,
legal immigrants save 296 dollars more on average per month nearly doubling
the savings of unauthorized immigrants. Therefore, legal immigrants keep
relatively more of their overall savings within the United States compared to
undocumented immigrants. This is a key feature we will model in our the-
oretical framework, where the key parameters are the proportion of savings
that are remittances. Our calculations show that, on average, legal immi-
grants send 40 percent of their savings as remittances whereas undocumented
immigrants send 62 percent of their savings. This substantial diﬀerence will
be one of the keys in our model and one of our contributions in this study,
since any legalization of immigrants will result in a higher proportion of sav-
ings staying in the US, promoting capital formation and economic growth.
Similar trends to those describe are apparent when we look at educational
attainment as well as years resided in the United States. More educated
immigrants are less likely to send remittances back home and more likely to
save with a higher average amount compared to less educated immigrants.
Similarly, the longer an immigrant stays in the United Stated, the less likely
that s/he sends money back home while saving more.
Another important aspect in our model has to do with the labor produc-
tivity of the diﬀerent types of immigrants. The best empirical approximation
to this issue is wages, and for that we again have access to the Mexican Mi-
gration Project, which we have analyzed ourselves, and the work of Passel
and Cohn (2011) who also analyze this issue. As discussed directly in Figure
22 of Passel and Cohn (2011), and Table 4 below using the ACS 2009 and the
MMS 2005, the wages of undocumented immigrants are substantially lower
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than for legal immigrants and natives, even after considering only those who
have been in the U.S. for a long period of time as done in Passel and Cohn
(2011). While diﬀerent data sources would provide slightly diﬀerent pictures
of these diﬀerences, we assume that undocumented immigrants only have
access to 80 percent of the potential wages of other types of immigrants and
natives. This can vary by age as we see in Table 4, and in future versions
of our work we might consider implementing these age specific productivity
profiles.
3 The Model
3.1 Overview of the Model: Modeling Immigration
We solve and simulate an extended version of the OLG Life-Cycle model
(popularized in the profession by the seminal work of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ’
book in 1987) in a General Equilibrium framework, in which individuals
maximize expected discounted life time utility, which in this case depends on
consumption and leisure, and individuals face some of the key incentives from
social insurance programs, such as retirement incentives, and unemployment
insurance. We formally acknowledge that individuals face several sources
of uncertainty, including life-time and employment uncertainty. Individuals
own the firms of the economy that produce output with constant returns to
scale, and maximize profits leading to competitive factor prices, capital and
labor. The government collects taxes to provide goods and services, including
a Social Security and Unemployment Insurance system.
In terms of the role of migration in this model there are three key features,
which we discuss in turn below.
First, both legal and undocumented immigrants diﬀer from natives in that
part of their savings is in the form of remittances. These remittances are very
important in the model for reasons that will be obvious once we introduce
the formal model below, and a feature rarely exploited in migration models
(Cespedes 2011 is an exception). One interesting aspect of these remittances
is that while immigrants think of them as savings (which do provide utility,
however, as we will explain below) from the point of view of the US economy
they are (strictly speaking) not, because they are not factored into the capital
accumulation of the economy, and therefore do not help promote economic
growth. In a sense, these savings disappear from the system. Remittances
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are a tough problem to tackle given the empirical evidence we have gathered
so far, especially given the fact that we would need them measured for le-
gal and undocumented immigrants. Given the data we have discussed in the
previous section we will assume that legal immigrants remit a fraction  of
their resources to their home country, and undocumented immigrants remit
a fraction  . In the data the latter is substantially higher than the former.
A generalization of this set up would allow remittances to be a continuous
choice similar to consumption, something we might consider when extend-
ing our already complex model. The key policy move we will discuss later
would allow the conversion of some undocumented immigrants to legal immi-
grants, in our model that will mean that some individuals would switch from
making remittances a fraction  , to making them a fraction , which
in turn would increase the capital stock in the economy, with the positive
consequences (which we will describe later) that this has on the economy.
Second, only natives and legal immigrants can receive Social Security re-
tirement benefits, but everyone in the economy pays Social Security taxes.
This means that undocumented immigrants do face these taxes (which in
principle could be just a fraction of what others pay) but do not get any-
thing out of them. Similarly, everyone in the economy pays unemployment
insurance taxes and gets unemployment insurance which is a fraction of their
average wages, but undocumented immigrants get a lower replacement rate
than natives and legal immigrants. Again, here we are trying to exemplify
the fact that undocumented immigrants cannot completely benefit from the
social insurance system in place in the economy even if they help support it
with their taxes.
Third, the labor productivity of undocumented immigrants will be as-
sumed to be lower than that of natives and legal immigrants, again following
the empirical evidence we have presented in the previous section. In par-
ticular we will assume, as discussed above, that the labor productivity of
undocumented is 80 percent of that of natives and legal immigrants.
The key consequences of our theoretical model regarding policy changes,
comes from the tension between the positive eﬀects of a move of some indi-
viduals to legal status, which leads to more real savings in the economy and
higher labor productivity, and therefore more capital accumulation, which
leads to lower interest rates and higher growth, and the negative ones in the
form of additional Social Security payments, and higher unemployment in-
surance payments. Making this trade-oﬀ explicit, is the main contribution of
our work.
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3.2 Model Details
The economy is populated by households, firms and a government. House-
holds are distinguished by their status  ∈ {0 1 2}, where  = 0 denotes
natives,  = 1 denotes unauthorized immigrants and  = 2 denotes legal
immigrants. We will consider a model with no immigration flows, namely,
we assume a population distribution with an exogenous share of agents in
each status. An important distinction between immigrants and natives is
that we assume that a proportion of the immigrants’ savings are sent abroad
as remittances and this proportion is higher for unauthorized immigrants.
Given this, the proportion of immigrants will play an important role for the
economy wide savings rate.
Households make investment/savings decisions and are subject to employ-
ment and mortality shocks. Firms rent capital and labor from the households
to produce output. The government sets payroll taxes (Social Security and
Unemployment taxes) for the workers and it provides both Social Security
benefits to the retirees and unemployment benefits to the unemployed as long
as their status is  ∈ {0 2}. Only a proportion  of unauthorized immi-
grants pay taxes but none of the unauthorized immigrants retire or receive
Social Security benefits. We denote the set of unauthorized immigrants that
pay taxes by , which in the initial version of the model will be set to one
for simplicity. Moreover, they receive lower unemployment benefits than the
other unemployed agents, which are a proxy for other state welfare programs.
Demographics. Time is discrete. In each period, there are  overlapping
generations of agents and population grows at the rate of . Agents start
deriving utility at age 1 and can live up to a maximum of age . Retirement
for agents with status  ∈ {0 2} is mandatory at age , with 1    .9
Unauthorized immigrants do not retire. Agents of age    are called
workers and those with age  ≥  are called retirees. Each agent faces a
positive probability of early death which is exogenous and independent of
other household characteristics. The probability of surviving from age − 1
to age  is denoted by  ∈ (0 1), with 1 = 1 and +1 = 0. If we denote by
9This is an important simplification since it allows us not to model the claiming and
labor supply decision that accompanies the withdrawal from the labor force. Rust and
Phelan (1997), French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), Iskhakov (2010), and
French and Jones (2001) make excellent contributions to the structural retirement liter-
ature in a partial equilibrium setting. While I˙nmohorog˘lu and Kitao (2009a and 2009b),
and Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2011) present a General Equilibrium model with
endogenous retirement.
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 the conditional probability to live from period − 1 to , with 1 = 1, the
unconditional survival probability is calculated from 1 = 1 and
 = −1,   1
For example, 2 = 2, 3 = 23, ...Due to the probability of death,
there are accidental bequests, which are distributed (as assets) among the
members of all generations with status  ∈ {0 2} in the amount . The
share of individuals of age  in the population is , withP=1  = 1.
Preferences. Agents maximize expected discounted lifetime utility

X
=1
−1 ¡Π=1¢ ( )
where  is consumption,  represents the total value of remittances sent
abroad,  is the time-discount factor and  is the expectation operator. The
instantaneous utility function ( ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in all arguments. Notice that we need to include the remittances in the utility
function because otherwise agents see them as a tax on savings, which leads
to unrealistically low capital accumulation.
Labor Endowments. Each period, agents below the mandatory retire-
ment age face a stochastic employment opportunity. We assume that an
unemployed agent of age  and status  ∈ {0 2} receives unemployment
benefits that are equal to a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of their wage when employed
at age . Unauthorized immigrants receive a fraction of their wage when
employed of   . Note that unauthorized immigrants do not usually re-
ceive unemployment benefits, but we use this as a proxy for other state level
welfare programs.
Unemployment insurance is financed with a tax of  on the employed.
We let  ∈ {1  0} denote the employment state for agents with ∈ {0 2} so
that the agent is employed if  = /1 unemployed if  =  and retired if  = 010.
Similarly, we let  = {1 } for agents with  = 1. The employment shock
 is generated by a stationary Markov transition matrix Π that is identical
across agents and over the life cycle, where Π0 is the probability of state 0
given .
10Alternatively, this state can also be interpreted as a productivity shock.
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If an agent of age  is employed, he supplies one unit of labor and has a
labor eﬃciency of  for agents with  ∈ {0 2} and of  =  with   1
for agents with  = 1 . The total wage income of an individual of age  is
given by:
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 if    and  ∈ {0 2}
  if  = 1
0 if  ≥ 
where  is the aggregate wage rate.
Government Policy. The government runs a Pay-As-You-Go Social
Security program in order to provide retirement income. We assume that the
retirement system is self-financed. In order to finance retirement benefits, the
government collects payroll taxes   from the labor earnings of workers. The
Social Security funds are distributed to all retirees who are either natives or
legal immigrants. The benefit for an individual of age  is given by:
 =
½
0 if    or  = 1
 if  ≥  and  ∈ {0 2}
where  is a fraction  of the average lifetime employed income for agents
with status  ∈ {0 2} :
 = 
P−1
=1 
 − 1
As explained above, unauthorized immigrants do not receive Social Secu-
rity benefits.
Disposable Income.
The disposable income of an individual with status  ∈ {0 2} and age 
is equal to:
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (1−  −  ) if    and  = 1 and  ∈ {0 2}
 if    and  =  and  ∈ {0 2}
 if  ≥  and  ∈ {0 2}
 (1−  −  ) if  = 1 and  = 1 and  ∈  if  = 1 and  = 1 and  ∈   if  =  and  = 1
Asset Structure. Households own financial assets , which represent
claims to capital and debts when they are negative. Capital depreciates at
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the constant rate . We assume that households face a borrowing limit of
 ≥ 0. This implies that financial assets must satisfy:
 ≥ −
Production Technology. There is a representative firm that produces
output with the constant returns to scale technology:
 = 
where  is total factor productivity (TFP),  is aggregate non-housing cap-
ital and  is the total labor supplied.
The firm solves a static problem by hiring factors from the households to
maximize period profits:
max
{}
 − − ( + )
The optimality conditions determine the factor prices  = −1
and  = −1 −  competitively.
Household Problem. In what follows, we write the problem of the
household recursively, with primes denoting a variable next period. An agent
is characterized by the individual set of state variables  = (  ), with
0 = (+ 1 0 00), where  is the age,  is employment state,  is the asset
wealth and  is the status as a native or immigrant of diﬀerent types, with
0 = . The maximization problem of households can be written recursively
as follows:
 (  ) = max
{≥00} { ( ) + +1 (
0 0 0)} s.t. (1)
 + 0 =  + (1 + ) ( (1− ) +  |1−|) +  |1−|
 = 0 (2)
0 ≥ −
where  represents the proportion of savings that is sent abroad by an
agent of age  and status , where 0 = 0 and 1  2.
The Bellman equation (1) represents the problem of a household. A
household chooses consumption  and financial assets 0. The first constraint
is the budget constraint. The first term on the right hand side is the net
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income from providing labor supply to the market, multiplied by the idio-
syncratic productivity shock  and net of payroll taxes. The second term is
the asset income from financial assets, which earns a return of . The third
term denotes the Social Security benefits  and the last term is the transfer
from accidental bequests. The last constraint is the borrowing constraint.
The solution to the dynamic programming problem above yields optimal
decision rules  = (  ), 0 = (  ).
3.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition. Given the government parameters  , , , , , a recursive
competitive equilibrium is defined as the set of value functions  (  ),
optimal decision rules (  ), (  ), aggregate stocks of capital
 and labor , prices ,  transfers , Social Security benefits  and a
measure  ( ) of agents of each age with state  such that:
1. The value function  (  ) is the solution to the household’s
problem defined above and (  ), (  ) are the associated policy
functions.
2. The representative firm maximizes profits, leading to the competitive
factor prices
 = −1 − 
 = −1
3. The following market clearing conditions are satisfied:
 =
−1X
=1
X

X
:∈{02}
 (  = 1)  +
X
=1
X

 (  = 1 = 1) 
 0 =
X
=1
X

X

X

 ( ) (  ) (1−)
where  represents the proportion of income that is sent abroad by an
agent of age  and status , where 0 = 0 and 1  2.
4. The agent measures  ( ) and  satisfy:
+1 = +11 +  and
X

 = 1
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 (0 00) =
X

X
:0=()
X

Π0Π0−1 ( )
where the initial measure 1 ( ) is given and
Π0 =
⎡
⎣
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎤
⎦
reflects that immigration status does not change for any agent.
5. The Social Security program and the unemployment insurance are self
financed:
 
−1X
=1
X

X
:∈{02}
 (  = 1)
+ 
X
=1
X

 (  = 1 = 1)
=
X
=
X

X
:∈{02}
 ( ) 

−1X
=1
X

X
:∈{02}
 (  = 1)
+
X
=1
X

 (  = 1 = 1)
=
−1X
=1
X

X
:∈{02}
 (  = )
+
X
=1
X

 (  =  = 1)
Note that this implies that
 =
006
h
 (08672 + 00958)P−1=1  + 0037P=1 i
094
h
(08672 + 00958)P−1=1  + 0037P=1 i
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  = 
P
=
P

P
:∈{02}  (  = 0)

hP−1
=1
P

P
:∈{02}  ( 1)  + 
P
=1
P
  ( 1 1) 
i
Where we introduce the assumption that the stationary employment dis-
tribution results in a stationary unemployment rate of 6 percent, and we
introduce the proportion of the population in each status that indicates
whether the agent is a native, a legal immigrant, or an unauthorized im-
migrant. Here we use the calculations from Passel and Cohn (2011) that
indicate that the 11.2 million undocumented immigrants represent 3.7 per-
cent of the population (as of March of 2010), while the 29 million legal
immigrants represent 9.58 percent of the population, and the rest are natives
representing 86.72 percent of the total population of the U.S.
6. Accidental bequests satisfy:X

X

X

X

 ( )  (  ) (1−) (1− +1) = 
Using the market clearing conditions, it is easy to show that the aggregate
resource constraint of the economy is:
 + 0 = (1− ) + 
where  =X

X

X

X

 ( ) (  )
4 Calibration and Solution Method
4.1 Calibration
In the model, one period represents one year. Period 1 in the model corre-
sponds to the actual age group of 21 and agents can live for a maximum of
 = 65 periods, implying that death is certain after period 65 (age of 85). 
is set to 45, implying that agents in the native and legal immigrant category
retire at the actual age of 65. The annual population growth  is set at 1.2
percent, corresponding to the average annual population growth in the US
over the last 50 years. The survival probabilities  are taken from the Life
Tables of the Social Security Administration.
The Social Security tax is set to match a replacement ratio  of 40 percent
over the average wage income and the unemployment insurance ratio is set
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to  = 30 of the employed wage for agents with status  ∈ {0 2},
and  = 20 for undocumented immigrants.
Regarding the preferences, the instantaneous utility function takes the
following form:
 () = 
1−
1−  +
where the risk aversion parameter  is set to 2. The parameters ,  and 
are calibrated to match long run ratios computed from NIPA data to ensure
that our economy conforms to the US ratios of  = 024 and  = 28 in the
postwar period, as well as to the capital income share in the US data. The
parameter  is chosen to be 1, just as a normalization, and  is normalized
to 10. In what follows, we describe the construction of these ratios.
For simplicity, we assume that the growth rate of output is zero. This
implies that the cross-sectional eﬃciency profile is the same as the longitudi-
nal profile for a given household. We look at averages for the years 1947 to
2008. We define the capital stock  to include private fixed assets, the stock
of inventories and the stock of consumer durables. Accordingly,  includes
private investment, changes in inventories, consumer durable spending and
net exports.
Our definition of  in the above ratios captures GDP. Given our treatment
of consumer durables as capital stock, we also need to add the flow of services
from consumer durables to our measure of  . These flows are imputed in a
manner identical to Cooley and Prescott (1995), explained below.
The above calculations determine the four ratios mentioned above. For
the computation of the capital share in the production function, we follow
Cooley and Prescott’s (1995) approach closely. In particular, we first look at
GDP. Using Gross Domestic Income Table 1.10, we define Labor Income (LI)
to be compensation of employees, Unambiguous Capital Income (UCI) to be
rental income, corporate profits, interest and business current transfers and
Ambiguous Capital Income to include all the rest (i.e., proprietor’s income,
taxes on production and imports, less subsidies and the current surplus of
government enterprises). We also define depreciation (DEP) to be the con-
sumption of fixed capital. A preliminary share of capital income in private
income excluding housing  can then be calculated as
 =  + −
Using this share we calculate capital income in measured GDP excluding
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housing as ( ) and use this to impute the return to capital as
 = ( ( )− ) 
We then look at consumer durables and estimate their depreciation rate
by computing the investment to stock ratio and subtracting the growth rate
of real GDP (an average of 33). The return  and the individual
depreciation rates are then used to impute the value of service flows from
consumer durables. The imputed flow is added to our measure of  . The
capital share is then recomputed by adding this flow to capital income and
to GDP, which yields the share .
Given that we do not explicitly model a government, we have to choose
how to deal with the government sector in the data. Our treatment implicitly
assigns all government expenditures (consumption and investment) to private
consumption. An alternative approach would be to only focus on private
GDP and completely exclude the government sector from our calculations.11
Following this approach, and assuming that capital and labor shares are the
same in the government and in the private sector, has a negligible eﬀect on
our calibrated parameters.
We assume that the population growth rate is equal to  = 0012, corre-
sponding to the US population growth in the postwar period, and we con-
struct the depreciation rate for capital given our targets,
 =




−  = 0237
28 = 00726
To calculate the deterministic earnings profiles, we have used CPS data for
natives. We assume that legal immigrants have the same earnings profiles as
natives and the profile for unauthorized immigrants is 80 percent of the profile
for natives and legals. First, we construct hourly earnings data following the
same procedure as Heathcote et. al (2010). Subsequently, we follow Hansen’s
(1993) procedure to obtain life-cycle productivity profiles by age for each
year.
We assume that the share of unauthorized and legal immigrants is 3.7
percent and 9.58 percent of the total population, respectively. We therefore
impose the following initial conditions:
11Silos (2007) takes this approach.
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1 (1 1 0) = 094× 08672 and 1 (1  0) = 006× 08672
1 (1 1 2) = 094× 00958 and 1 (1  2) = 006× 00958
1 (1 1 1) = 094× 0037 and 1 (1  1) = 006× 0037
Note that the following has to be true:
X
=1
X

X

 (  1) = 0037
X
=1
X

X

 (  2) = 00958
X
=1
X

X

 (  0) = 08672
This also implies that, for all X

X

 (  1) = 0037X

X

 (  2) = 00958X

X

 (  0) = 08672
We assume an employment rate of 94 percent. The transition probability
matrix for the employment probability is chosen so that the probability of
employment is equal to
−1X
=1
X

X
:∈{02}
 (  = 1) +
X
=1
X

 (  = 1 = 1) = 094
Therefore,
Π =
∙
094 006
094 006
¸
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This also implies that the aggregate labor supply is given by:
 =
−1X
=1

X

X
:∈{02}
 ( 1) +
X
=1

X

 ( 1 1)
=
−1X
=1

X

X
:∈{02}
 ( 1) + 
X
=1

X

 ( 1 1)
094
"
(08672 + 00958)
−1X
=1
 + 0037
X
=1

#
and the unemployment tax rate can be written as follows
 =
P−1
=1
P

P
:∈{02}  ( ) +
P
=1
P
  (  1)hP−1
=1
P

P
:∈{02}  ( 1)  +
P
=1
P
  ( 1 1) 
i
006
h
 (08672 + 00958)P−1=1  + 0037P=1 i
094
h
(08672 + 00958)P−1=1  + 0037P=1 i
We now need to calibrate the parameters related to immigration. Re-
mittances will be calibrated using data from the Mexican Migration Project
and the Latin American Migration Project. The data consist of the pro-
portion savings and remittances by each immigrant type. 74 percent of the
unauthorized immigrants and only 55 percent of legal immigrants send re-
mittances. Moreover, the percentage of remittances out of total savings is
62 percent and 40 percent for the unauthorized and legal immigrants re-
spectively. Given this, we set 0 = 0, 1 = 62 and 2 = 40.
To calibrate the eﬃciency profiles of the unauthorized immigrants we have
used data from the same sources. The data indicate that the wages of unau-
thorized immigrants are between 70 percent and 80 percent of the wages of
natives and legal immigrants. Given this, we will set  = 075 for the ages in
which natives and legal work, and for the ages 65 to 85 we extrapolate the
productivity linearly. For the benchmark case, we assume that all unautho-
rized immigrants pay taxes, implying that  = 100. Later on we will
relax this assumption. Finally, we set  = 20 for agents with status
 = 1.
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4.2 Solution Method
To solve the model, we use a value function iteration algorithm. First, we
guess a value for  and . This allows us to calculate the factor prices
 and . Since the eﬃciency of labor is exogenous, we can also calculate
the aggregate labor supply , the unemployment tax , the Social Security
benefits  and the Social Security tax rate  . Second, we guess initial value
functions and policy functions for workers and retirees conditional on their
status and we solve the individual problem backwards starting from their
last period of life. Note that the wealth of a retiree is equal to
 =  |1−|+ (1−   − ) (1− |1−|)
whereas the wealth of a working agent is equal to:
 = (1 + ) ( (1− ) + ) + (1−   − ) if  = 1 and  ∈ {0 2}
 = (1 + ) ( (1− ) + ) + (1−   − ) if  =  = 1,  ∈ 
 = (1 + ) ( (1− ) + ) +  if  = 1 and  = 1 and  ∈ 
 = (1 + ) ( (1− ) + ) +  if  =  and  ∈ {0 2}
 = (1 + ) ( (1− ) + ) +  if  =  and  = 1
Third, we calculate the invariant distribution recursively and we use that
to calculate the cross-sectional asset profiles, which can be used to compute
the new aggregate capital and bequests. Fourth, we calculate the deviation
between the guesses for capital and bequests and the new calculated values.
If they are bigger than the tolerance level, we update the aggregates, go back
to step 2 and iterate until convergence. Last, we do welfare calculations. To
do this, we need to compute the the expected lifetime utility of a newborn
conditional on status as follows:X

 (  = 1 = 0) ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 0)
+
X

 (  =  = 0) ( = 1  = 0  =  = 0)
= 094 ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 0) + 006 ( = 1  = 0  =  = 0)
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X

 (  = 1 = 0) ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 2)
+
X

 (  =  = 2) ( = 1  = 0  =  = 2)
= 094 ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 2) + 006 ( = 1  = 0  =  = 2)
X

 (  = 1 = 0) ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 1)
+
X

 (  =  = 1) ( = 1  = 0  =  = 1)
= 094 ( = 1  = 0  = 1 = 1) + 006 ( = 1  = 0  =  = 1)
5 Numerical Results and Policy Experiments
The results of our model are in terms of economic aggregates as well as the
welfare of households. In this section we discuss the comparison between the
benchmark model with migration that we presented in the last section, and
modified versions of the model in which some undocumented immigrants are
legalized. Notice that this is exogenous, as it would be in reality as a function
of a legislative move by Congress.
The main policy experiment we have set ourselves to analyze has to do
with the consequences of some form of legalization process that makes some
undocumented immigrants eligible to become legal immigrants in our coun-
try. In our model, the initial proportion of natives and the two types of immi-
grants are fixed, but the policy experiment can be understood as introducing
the possibility of some flexibility in the transitions from undocumented status
to legal status.
In principle, any move to legalization in this framework will have three
consequences with diﬀerent eﬀects for the government and the economy.
First, legalization is expected to translate into higher savings because those
legal immigrants remit a smaller proportion of their resources back to their
countries, even if that can be partially oﬀset by the fact that newly legal-
ized immigrants might have to save a bit less than before because now they
can receive Social Security and a higher unemployment insurance benefit.
By definition, in our model this is exogenous, and this larger capital in the
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economy has the positive consequence of lowering the interest rate, increas-
ing the tax base and promoting growth. The economic intuition behind the
remittances assumption has to do with the way legal immigrants perceive
their attachment to the country, and the likelihood of using their new sta-
tus to reunite with some family members originally left in the country of
origin. The empirical evidence we have presented is in line with these as-
sumptions irrespective of length of stay in the country. Moreover, we find
that remittances are higher among those who have been in the U.S. for a
shorter period compared to immigrants who stay in the U.S. longer. Since
legal immigrants usually stay much longer in the U.S., we expect that legal-
ization will reduce the amout of remittances newly legalized immigrants will
send to their country. Second, legalization will bring a higher usage of social
insurance programs, including (but not limited in reality) to unemployment
insurance and retirement benefits, which is expected to aﬀect the tax rates
and the level of benefits. Third, since legal immigrants are more productive
than undocumented immigrants as their skills are better matched, the move
towards legalization increases the labor supply in the economy and therefore
the overall output in the economy, but puts downward pressure on wages,
and upward pressure on the interest rate.
Whether legalization of some undocumented immigrants translates into a
welfare improving strategy for the country will mainly depend on the relation-
ship between the decline in remittances (and their impact on the economy),
and the increase in usage of social insurance programs. This trade-oﬀ should
be taken into account when discussing legalization policies, and the search
for some kind of optimal path to solving the undocumented problem in our
country.
Our results shown in Table 5, indicate that legalization of a proportion
of undocumented immigrants has a positive eﬀect on economic aggregates
as well as welfare. We show in the table three set of results, including the
benchmark model with migration using the current (as of March of 2010)
distribution of natives, legal immigrants and undocumented immigrants, and
experiments of legalization of 30 percent, and 50 percent of undocumented
immigrants. Notice that the particular values in levels shown in the table do
not have a direct interpretation, since the quantities are normalized, and what
we are trying to match are the capital to output ratio, and the investment
to output ratio prevalent in the U.S. economy (2.8 and 0.24, respectively).
In the table, we can see that those ratios in the model are in all cases very
close to our benchmarks.
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Legalization leads to increases in capital stock, output, consumption, and
labor productivity in all cases. The increases are, however, rather small, of
the order of one to two tenths of 1 percent. This should not be surprising
since even a 50 percent legalization policy means that only around 1.8 percent
of the population will be changing status. Legalization leads to higher capital
through the lowering of remittances which compensate for the reduction in
precautionary savings due to provision of better social insurance to the newly
legalized immigrants. However, legalization results in higher taxes since now
the government pays a higher total level of unemployment insurance and
Social Security benefits to the newly legalized. Labor supply goes up because
newly legalized immigrants are more productive since they have access to
better jobs after legalization. As the inputs in the economy increase, output
and aggregate consumption go up. On the other hand, the labor supply eﬀect
dominates the capital eﬀect on prices in the case of 50 percent legalization.
As a result, wages go down while interest rates go up. Social Security benefits
are not aﬀected if 30 percent of undocumented immigrants are legalized, but
when 50 percent of immigrants are legalized, benefits go down slightly.
While the percentage changes seem very small, we cannot forget that we
are talking about eﬀects on a very large economy. When we look at the
changes in levels, we estimate that a 50 percent legalization rate would con-
tribute around 36 billion dollars to the economy by increasing the output,
providing positive overall welfare to the households. The eﬀects of legaliza-
tion on aggregates and welfare increase considerably with a high legalization
policy.
Interestingly, the welfare eﬀects we find have curious wrinkles to them.
We look at welfare changes for four diﬀerent groups: (1) natives, (2) pre-
vious legal immigrants, (3) newly legalized immigrants, and (4) remaining
unauthorized immigrants. We find that while natives, previous legal im-
migrants, and remaining unauthorized immigrants are slightly worse oﬀ, as
their welfare declines by between 0.1 to 0.2 percent, these losses are neg-
ligible compared to newly legalized immigrants’ welfare gain in the size of
more than 24 percent in both experiments. As a result, the overall welfare
of the economy increases by 0.2 percent when 30 percent of unauthorized
immigrants are legalized and 0.34 percent when 50 percent of unauthorized
immigrants are legalized. Therefore, we conclude that newly legalized house-
holds gain substantially as a result of the policy change as they leave the
unauthorized state in which they have no access to Social Security benefits
and only a fraction of the unemployment insurance. These gains will also
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have indirect positive eﬀects on a portion of natives and legal immigrants as
most unauthorized immigrants live in mixed households where some of the
members of the household are legal while some are not. On the other hand,
this composition eﬀect suggests that a welfare redistribution policy would be
necessary if the goal of the policy is to make everyone better oﬀ, including
additional taxes and fees on newly legalized immigrants.12
Our results, however, should be taken with caution since we do not model
a number of details of the social insurance system that could dampen the
positive eﬀects we find, like the access to federal programs that comes with
legalization (such as the Social Security Disability Insurance, the Supple-
mental Security Income, Medicare, and other programs). Additionally, we
do not model the possibility that newly legalized immigrants would bring
family members to the country which could start relying on the social insur-
ance program almost immediately. On the other hand, we have made the
assumption that all undocumented immigrants pay taxes. Social Security
Administration (SSA) actuaries, for example, assume only half of unautho-
rized immigrants pay Social Security taxes. If modeled more in line with this
estimate, we would find larger positive eﬀects. Overall, we consider these
results as preliminary but reasonable, and a starting point in the debate on
legalization looming in the near future.
6 Conclusions
It might seem relatively unimportant in comparison with some of the worries
that have kept the country busy in the last three years, when the world
economy has gone (and it is still going) through one of its worst periods in
recent memory and widespread instability seems to have settled in financial
markets, but immigration issues will continue to be present in our everyday
lives, and likely to be on the agenda of our policy makers. The reality is that
millions of individuals and families currently living in our borders came to
our country searching for a better life, but they did not necessarily follow
the procedures established by our government to do so. These millions of
undocumented immigrants contribute to our economy, but also maintain a
12The welfare calculations are in terms of compensating variations as a percentage of
consumption, with negative numbers indicating that the group is worse oﬀ and therefore
should be compensated, and positive numbers indicating that the group is better oﬀ, and
therefore is willing to pay to get the policy implemented.
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weak attachment to it. It is natural to ask whether some kind of legalization
process should be considered given that a large proportion of undocumented
immigrants have been in the country for a long period of time and have grown
their families here. In many cases, undocumented immigrant are parents
or grandparents of American citizens (in fact 73 percent of the children of
undocumented immigrants are U.S. citizens according to Passel and Cohn
2009). Even if welfare improvements of the legalization process would only
occur for newly legalized agents, the policy is still well worth considering as
it has indirect positive eﬀects to natives and legal immigrants living in these
mixed households.
Our research tries to bring to the forefront some of the economic conse-
quences of legalization, mainly the likely increase in capital stock thanks to
the fact that newly documented immigrants will likely invest in our country
a higher proportion of their resources now that their immigration status is
no longer a major stigma for their economic behavior. On the other hand,
this newly gained status will give them rights that will translate into a higher
usage of our social insurance system.
Our findings indicate that legalization would have a positive eﬀect on
the economic aggregates as well as on the welfare of households, due to sub-
stantial gains in welfare of newly legalized immigrants despite a small loss in
welfare for other groups. Higher rates of legalization have a larger positive ef-
fect on the overall economy. While the percentage increases in the aggregates
is small, a 50 percent legalization rates is expected to contribute around ad-
ditional 36 billion dollars to the economy. While most of the welfare increases
are expected to come from the improvements for the legalized immigrants, a
proper redistribution could help contribute to the higher welfare of everyone
in the economy.
Our results, however, should be taken with some caution since our model,
with all its complexities, still does not model a number of details of the so-
cial insurance system that could depress the positive eﬀects we find, like the
access to federal programs that comes with legalization such as the Social
Security Disability Insurance, the Supplemental Security Income, Medicare,
and other possible programs. On the other hand, we have made some strong
assumptions about the taxation of undocumented immigrants, which if mod-
eled more in line with some estimates by the Social Security Administration
(Feinleib and Warner 2005) would suggest our positive eﬀects could get big-
ger. Overall, we consider this set of results as reasonable, and a starting point
in the careful modeling of the consequences of legalization of immigrants for
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our economy, especially with a debate on legalization looming in the future.
We hope our research provides a step in the direction of having a framework
to evaluate and discuss the consequences of possible migration reform.
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Table 3: Remittances and Savings of Immigrants from MMP and LAMP, in 2008 Dollars
Remittances Savings
Percentage Amount Percentage Amount
All Immigrants 0.65 404 0.50 515
Immigration Status
Unauthorized 0.74 400 0.49 377
Legal 0.55 412 0.51 673
Education
Less than 12 0.67 396 0.49 493
12 and above 0.52 494 0.54 688
Years in the U.S.
0-5 Years 0.73 384 0.47 382
5-10 Years 0.72 450 0.59 512
10 Years and above 0.55 414 0.54 663
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